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
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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505



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27 JUL 1977

Dear Al,

How thoughtful of you to send me a copy of Beaufort of the Admiralty. It looks like an exciting book and most appropriate for a grounded sailor! I look forward to diving into it at an early opportunity when I get the mound of official papers whittled down a little bit! Seriously, it will be just the thing for the first air trip I have and I do look forward to reading it.

I hope we can get together again before long. In the meantime, many thanks.

Yours,

STANSFIELD TURNER

Mr. Alfred Friendly



(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE *open/alph*)

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Al Furdyk
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From

Executive Registry

TOM CALLAGHAN

77-8503

Dear Admiral Turner:

You may recall my briefing for you and your AFSOUTH Staff last October on the subject of Allied economic cooperation in armaments.

I don't know whether your new duties have involved you in this standardization and burden-sharing issue but (with respect) they should. There is no economic reason why Allied conventional forces should be inferior to those of the Warsaw Pact.

The President's initiative at the NATO Summit is an excellent start. But the scale of our cooperative standardization efforts continue to be far less than is needed. These points are made in the attached statement.

With best wishes,

Tom Callaghan

0/DCI/afsh



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The Center for Strategic and International Studies

Georgetown University / 1800 K Street Northwest / Washington DC 20006 / Telephone 202 / 833-8595

Cable Address: CENSTRAT

STANDARDIZATION: Lessening the Danger of Nuclear War

A Statement for the

Legislation and National Security Subcommittee

Government Operations Committee

House of Representatives

21 July 1977

by

Thomas A. Callaghan Jr., Director

Allied Interdependence Project

Georgetown Center

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE:

I thank you for the opportunity to appear before your Subcommittee to discuss standardization, Allied economic cooperation in armaments, and lessening the danger of nuclear war.

In my statement, I will deal first, with what standardization means; second, with the military, economic and political price the North Atlantic Alliance pays for the lack of standardization; third, with the major structural and attitudinal obstacles to standardization; and fourth, with the magnitude of the effort required to achieve economic cooperation in armaments between Europe and North America.

WHAT STANDARDIZATION MEANS. Unfortunately, the term standardization connotes a technical military procurement problem. It is not. There is a military, an economic, and a political dimension to standardization. Taken together, they involve policy issues that merit the continuing attention of the Congress.

Militarily, standardization means at least the same calibers, the same ammunition, the same fuel, the same frequencies, the same data transmission rates, the same identification schemes -- in short, it means that Allied forces should at least be able to operate together.

There are those in Europe and in the United States who say we should focus only on the military dimension of standardization -- on interoperability. It is sufficient, they say, for Allied forces to rearm, refuel and communicate with one another, without being concerned about the economic and political dimensions of the problem. But why settle for so little, when the attainable economic and political dimensions of standardization offer so much more?

Economically, standardization means the efficient utilization of Allied research, development, procurement, logistic and manpower resources. It means no unnecessary duplication of development effort. It means longer production runs, larger weapon quantities and lower unit costs. It means the same repair parts, the same depots, the same maintenance and training facilities and equipment. It means the more effective use of Allied manpower by combining the 14 national logistics systems for 39 armed forces into a single NATO Logistic System for NATO's land, sea and air forces.

It means plowing those duplicative (indeed, multiplicative) logistics resources back into Allied weapons development and production. Thus, standardization can (in its economic dimension) mean many more jobs for the high technology defense industries of Europe and North America. It also makes it possible to share equitably the financial burdens of Allied defense, as well as the economic benefits (jobs, technological progress) of defense development and production.

It means adequate defense, within reasonable defense budgets.

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The money we waste in duplication could much better be spent in providing our troops with fewer different weapons in greater numbers, and in developing weapons which improve the ability of our forces to work and fight together. (Emphasis added)

The fourteen armed nations of the North Atlantic Alliance are together spending over \$110,000,000,000 per year -- more than \$9,000,000,000 every month -- on general purpose forces. This sum should provide a credible, collective, war-fighting capability, sufficient to maintain the conventional force balance with the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. It does not!

The fact that it does not is less a matter of what the massive, conventional force build-up of the Warsaw Pact is doing to NATO, than it is the consequence of what the nations of the Alliance are doing to each other. It's not that the Russians are ten feet tall. They just seem that way -- because we and the other nations of the North Atlantic Alliance have cut ourselves off at our knees.

Today, for example, we Americans, the British, the Dutch, the Germans, the Italians -- and the French and Belgians working together -- seven Allied nations are developing six different tactical communications systems. None of these six systems can communicate with the other, nor can any of them communicate with the NATO Integrated Communications System (NICS). At the NATO Defense Planning Committee meeting in Brussels in May, Defense Secretary HAROLD BROWN offered to re-direct the American Tri-Tac System, if our Allies would do likewise, to see if together we could evolve a common inter-communicable system.

This is a good start, but much more needs to be done. We must reclaim 15 years of Allied failure to cooperate in armaments development, production and support, if we are to begin to match the 10-year build-up of the Warsaw Pact's conventional forces. NATO's Integrated Military Command today commands almost nothing that is integrated: neither its tactical doctrine for the defense of Europe; nor its military equipment requirements; nor its weaponry, its ammunition, nor its repair parts; nor its "days of supply"; nor its logistics, its communications, nor its operational training. This must not be permitted to continue.

Meanwhile, most Allied military and political leaders concede that a Warsaw Pact attack would have to be met by early recourse to theater nuclear weapons, with all the danger of nuclear escalation. One must ask:

Do the heads of government, and the parliaments, of the fourteen armed nations of the Alliance have the moral right to place an annual \$110.0 billion tax burden upon their people, to produce conventional forces collectively so weak, that the day could come when the only difference between NATO and The Alamo is that we would have the option of calling down a nuclear holocaust, before being over-run?

The answer, obviously is NO, they do not have the moral right! Then why do they? There are no easy scapegoats here. Concepts of sovereignty and indepen-

Internally, standardization requires Allied partnership in armaments. It requires a degree of political cohesion within the Alliance that would glue Europe and North America together with bonds of military-economic self-interest so strong as perhaps never to be sundered.

Externally, standardization would say to the Soviet Union that the enormous economic, technological and industrial resources of Europe and North America are now combined for our common defense:

You can not drive a wedge between us; you can not out-produce us; you can not blackmail us; you can not overwhelm us; but you can begin talking to us about meaningful reductions in mankind's armaments burdens.

That day, unfortunately, is some time into the future. Today, for the lack of standardization, the North Atlantic Alliance is in serious trouble.

COST OF DE-STANDARDIZATION. Let us look at the price the North Atlantic Alliance now pays for its de-standardization and non-interoperability. It is a heavy price. Incredibly, Europe and North America, the two richest, most technologically advanced industrial economies in the world, treaty-bound together for mutual security, are being out-produced and out-deployed in almost every conventional weapons area by the more backward economies of the Warsaw Pact.

Yet successive Secretaries of Defense have estimated that NATO and the Warsaw Pact are devoting approximately the same resources to the development, production, training, maintenance, operation and support of general purpose forces. What do these roughly equal defense resource commitments produce?

- * For the Warsaw Pact it produces a massive, standardized collective force, capable of operating effectively together.
- * For NATO it produces a de-standardized collection of forces, qualitatively uneven, quantitatively inferior, unable to fight for the same period of time at the same munitions expenditure rates, and with only a limited ability to rearm, refuel, repair, support, supply or even communicate with one another.

Why is NATO getting so little, and the Warsaw Pact so much, from the same resource expenditures? OLIVER C. BOILEAU, President of Boeing Aerospace Co., recently explained to a Financial Times Conference in London, that

The weapons planners in the communistic nations are capitalizing on what we in the free enterprise system proved long ago -- that one large production run is cheaper and more efficient than many small ones. They are beating us at our own game.

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dence resist the obvious need for Allied interdependence and cooperation. President JIMMY CARTER made a dramatic departure from the prepared text of his address to the NATO Ministerial meeting in London to make the point that:

In each of our countries, economic and political factors pose serious obstacles. None of our countries, especially the United States, has been free from fault. (Emphasis added)

OBSTACLES. There are many obstacles to Allied economic cooperation in armaments, but certain attitudinal and structural problems are perhaps the most intractable.

In the United States, public and political attitudes impact upon Pentagon policies, and vice versa. We still see ourselves as the Arsenal of Democracy. We have been slow to realize that even the United States is resource-limited. We prefer to go it alone, to meet any challenge, and so forth.

For more than two years now, we have been engaged in a great national defense debate on "Who is Number One -- the Soviet Union, or the United States?" The debate is reflected in the annual Posture Statements of successive Defense Secretaries, in which fulsome comparisons are made of American and Soviet strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, and general purpose forces.

Policy-makers have been slow to realize that this is both the right and the wrong issue for national debate. It is the right issue if one is comparing strategic nuclear capabilities. Only the United States has the resources to maintain the strategic nuclear balance with the Soviet Union.

But it is the wrong national defense issue if one is comparing conventional force capabilities. The United States does not provide the majority of NATO's conventional forces. Europe does. This means that no matter how large the American defense budget, nor how superior the American weapons technology, the United States can not, by its resources alone, maintain the conventional force balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The military-industrial effort required is a NATO effort -- a combined European/North American armaments effort. And there is no such effort!

The media has not reported the need for Allied cooperation. The public is unaware of it. The Congress has not demanded it. Neither the legislation that passed the Congress last year, nor the President's initiatives at the NATO Summit, reflect a broad, strong public or political consensus that we can no longer go it alone. Little wonder then that the FY '78 Defense Posture Statement lists "the role of Allies" in a chapter entitled "Other Considerations". No wonder also, that the Pentagon justifies each weapons development project in terms of its one-on-one superiority over Soviet weaponry -- not on how it would mesh with complementary developments in Europe, and thereby strengthen the conventional force of the Alliance.

If neither the media, nor the public, nor the Congress is concerned as to "Why NATO is Not Number One?" we should not be surprised that the Pentagon isn't too concerned either. The standardization legislation requires the Pentagon to report annually on the progress that is being made in implementing

the legislation. This year the Congress received the Third Annual Rationalization/Standardization Report -- a 104-page, double-spaced document. Seemingly, much is being done. But if the Congress were to study the 386-page single-spaced FY'78 Defense Posture Statement, they would find standardization mentioned on only 6 pages.

In other words, standardization and cooperation with our Allies is for the Pentagon -- as for the nation -- a thing apart.

But putting Allies aside for the moment, even the United States itself pays a high price for trying to go it alone. The Senate Armed Services Committee Report on the FY '78 Authorization bill makes the following points:

Between 1965 and 1975 the funding for technology base programs remained essentially constant, but because of inflation this amounted to an almost 50 percent reduction in real level of effort. (p. 76)

There are strong indications that the Department of Defense tries to keep twice as many projects alive as can be reasonably funded at a full level of effort. The result is that many programs crawl at such a slow rate that they are obsolete well before they are deployed to the forces or are overtaken by subsequently developed technologies. (p. 75)

Over-extended, doing everything ourselves, the Senate Armed Services Committee observations are confirmed in the same FY '78 Defense Posture Statement, which acknowledges that:

The main constraint on the United States, ironically enough, is not trained manpower but military equipment and supplies. (p. 113)

Allied burden-sharing through standardization means technology base deficiencies in the United States could be reinforced by complementary technology base efforts in Europe. Under-funded development projects in the United States could be undertaken in Europe, so that complementary projects on each side of the Atlantic were funded at a full level of effort, and would be moving rapidly towards early production and deployment. With longer production runs, neither the United States, nor Europe, would be constrained by insufficient military equipment and supplies. If our ability to help one another in wartime is to have credibility, then we must demonstrate an ability to work together in peacetime.

This is what the Congress intended when it passed the standardization legislation last year. But it won't just happen. Somebody must be put in charge.

Last year, Mr. CARL DAMM, a member of the Bundestag, and the Chairman of the Defense Cooperation Subcommittee of the North Atlantic Assembly, asked me what the Pentagon would do with this new standardization legislation. I answered not very much until they put somebody in charge. He asked me what I meant.

I answered that if we were to count down through the echelons below the

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Secretary of Defense, we would have to reach the seventh management level before we would find the first official with full time responsibility for implementing the statutory standardization policy of the United States. And that seventh level official has no management control, no policy control, and no money control.

Mr. DAMM commented: "It is the same in every defense ministry in the Alliance!"

Senators SAM NUNN (Dem. Ga.) and DEWEY F. BARTLETT (Rep. Okla.), in their excellent report on "NATO and the New Soviet Threat", addressed this problem as follows:

Serious consideration should be given to establishing within each ministry of defense powerful bureaucratic constituencies committed solely to achieving standardization and interoperability. For the Department of Defense, this might entail creation of an office of standardization in both the Office of the Secretary of Defense and with each service. The institutionalization of the impetus toward standardization would provide a major counterweight to contrary parochial political and economic interests.

The Congress itself could "institutionalize the impetus toward standardization" by establishing a subcommittee to review our collective NATO posture. During the annual procurement authorization process, the subcommittee could require the Pentagon to present its conventional weapons projects in the context of complementary European projects. The Congress could then assess whether the combined European/North American weapons acquisition programs were designed to maintain the conventional force balance with the Warsaw Pact -- and if not, why not.

The subcommittee could do other things as well:

- * It could insure that the cargoes intended for our planned ten-to-twenty billion-dollar increased airlift-sealift capability are standardized, so that we could "reinforce our Allies";
- * It could inquire as to how many standardized Warsaw Pact divisions, wings, etc. our MBFR negotiators believe must be eliminated to improve the balance with Allied divisions and wings which can not (for the time being) operate effectively together.

This subcommittee would, for the first time in 28 years, provide the Congress with an institutional mechanism and procedure for annually assessing the acquisition, deployment, support, readiness and reinforcement of the Alliance as a collective force. MBFR negotiations could be reviewed for their impact on the collective posture of the Alliance versus the Warsaw Pact. The subcommittee would inevitably focus media attention upon Alliance needs and capabilities. The public would be better informed. The Pentagon would respond to this Congressional interest and concern. And our European Allies

would also respond, for they would want to be seen by the American public to be carrying their fair share of the Allied defense burden.

But burden-sharing can not be separated from benefit-sharing. If Europe is to carry its fair share of the financial burdens, then Europe has the right to expect its fair share of the economic benefits: of the jobs and the challenge and the pride associated with large, technologically significant weapons projects.

It is particularly important that the United States be prepared to meet Europe half-way, or perhaps a little more than half-way. We must recognize that Allied economic cooperation in armaments will be virtually impossible until Europe aggregates its defense procurement efforts, and rationalizes its defense industrial base.

With the Chair's permission, I would like to introduce into the record at the end of my statement an article I wrote for the NATO Review of October, 1976 entitled: "Standardization: Le Defi American a l'Europe" ("The American Challenge to Europe"). Simply stated, this article explains why the European nation-states are too small for cooperation with the United States; why European defense markets are too small to sustain healthy defense industries; and why European defense industries are too small to develop and produce competitive systems to a transatlantic scale.

The Congress recognized this European structural problem in the legislation it passed last year, declaring it to be

....the sense of the Congress that standardization of weapons and equipment within the North Atlantic Alliance on the basis of a "two-way street" concept of cooperation in defense procurement between Europe and North America could only work in a realistic sense if the European nations operated on united and collective basis. Accordingly, the Congress encourages the governments of Europe to accelerate their present efforts to achieve European armaments collaboration among all European members of the Alliance.

President CARTER made much the same point at the NATO Summit when he emphasized that:

A common European defense production effort would help to achieve economies of scale beyond the reach of national programs. A strengthened defense production base in Europe would enlarge the opportunities for two-way trans-Atlantic traffic in defense equipment.

I hope that European and the North American members of the Alliance will join in exploring ways to improve cooperation in the development, production and procurement of defense equipment. This joint examination could involve the European Program Group as it gathers strength and cohesion.

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strong Allied conventional forces, and thereby lessen the danger of nuclear war, is but a first step towards fashioning a world our youth will want to live in. They will expect us to aim high, for the stakes are high.

MAGNITUDE OF EFFORT REQUIRED. Aiming high means we must move rapidly towards economic cooperation in weapons development, production and support. We need to mobilize the already committed resources of this Alliance. But how?

It is instructive to turn back the clock to April, 1941, when Canadian Prime Minister MACKENZIE KING and President FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT met at Hyde Park to discuss a similar problem: how to mobilize the resources of the North American continent.

These were two successful and practical politicians. What they didn't do is every bit as significant as what they did do. They didn't get lost in the bartering of individual projects. They didn't haggle over the resolution of problems. They were much too practical. They knew they could not mobilize the resources of this continent without a valid concept, and a basic structure. They knew also that if the concept and the structure were right -- the projects, and a host of problems associated with the projects, would sort themselves out.

The concept was simply that each country would produce and provide the other with the defense equipment it was best able to make. The structure was also simple: military trade. The weapons and equipment which Canada produced, and sold to the United States -- in turn provided Canada with the dollars it needed to buy weapons and equipment from the United States.

To show they meant business, President ROOSEVELT and Prime Minister KING established dollar purchase goals to be met by each country. Each country, they said, would (in the twelve months following the Hyde Park Agreement) place orders with the other for between \$200.0 million and \$300.0 million of military equipment. The purchase targets may seem small until we translate them into 1977 dollars: between \$800.0 million and \$1.2 billion in orders from each other in twelve months!

In the 36 years since the Hyde Park Agreement, there has been a North American Defense Market between Canada and the United States. No similar trading structure exists within the North Atlantic Alliance. If we are to mobilize the resources of the Alliance, then Europe and North America must establish a new two-way transatlantic structure which recognizes that standardization is macro-economic problem, which can only be solved by military trade.

A 15-year backlog of deferred cooperative effort will not permit us to focus on new development projects only. Short-term results must also be sought. We must achieve the optimum interoperability of current inventories. We must bring our days of supply to agreed uniform levels. There must be procurements from on another, and a start made on common logistic support. Employment and other political benefits must begin to appear within the terms of incumbent Congressman and Parliamentarians.

But long term goals must also be established, so that the Alliance will never again find itself fielding forces that can not operate together.

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Mr. Chairman, in your address to the Economic Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly in May, following the NATO Summit, you made the telling point that

While the European members of the Alliance will reach their own conclusions about how the work of the European Program Group should be coordinated with the United States and Canada, I do not think that we can afford a leisurely approach to this problem. (Emphasis added)

You have stated the dilemma we face. On the one hand, Europe will not make the extensive institutional changes and investment which military trade between Europe and North America entails, unless and until they become convinced that the United States is prepared to meet them half-way. On the other hand, the standardization legislation, the President's NATO Summit initiatives, your statement, and these hearings, should make the point that while the United States is prepared to meet Europe half-way -- Europe in turn must meet us half-way -- must achieve European armaments collaboration on a united and collective basis.

How then can we move together? We must recognize that Europe can not (with the best of good will) make these changes by itself. American leadership must play the catalytic role. We must be prepared to offer Europe something that the countries of Europe can not offer one another. The goals I will propose at the end of my statement will indicate how this can be done.

But first, we must face one final attitudinal obstacle found on each side of the Atlantic. It must be overcome, or a credible, collective conventional deterrent will never be possible.

Allied economic cooperation in weapons development, production, trade and support is no small nor easy task. It involves the combined Allied expenditure of more than \$30.0 billion per year on weapons development and procurement -- and an even larger sum on support. Some say the Alliance is too fragile to face up to the task. They see the magnitude of the effort required in all its difficulties. They argue for small, achievable mini-steps. Seemingly, they are satisfied that one or two standardized projects a year represents progress in a more than \$30.0 billion a year weapons acquisition process. But small efforts will not maintain the conventional force balance in Europe in the face of the massive and relentless build-up of Warsaw Pact forces. As the British economist and philosopher John Stuart Mill put it:

For a great evil, a small remedy does not produce a small result; it simply does not produce any results at all.

It is time to abandon the small remedy approach, and face up to the magnitude of the political and economic cooperation required to sustain the military effectiveness of this Alliance. Cooperative structures, macro-economic in scale and demonstrated to be necessary, are bound to garner public and political support. They will also have an appeal to the imagination and idealism of our youth. That in itself is of critical importance. The least-noticed weakness of the North Atlantic Alliance is of the spirit -- its lack of relevance to, and support from, the youth of Europe and North America.

The cooperative and effective utilization of Allied defense resources to create

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How do we do this? In my view, the President of the United States, with the bipartisan support of the United States Congress, should propose a macro-economic transatlantic bargain to Europe. The United States would:

- * Offer to match every defense dollar Europe spent in the United States with a dollar spent in Europe.
- * Offer to match the cost of every system developed in Europe for NATO use by an American defense development also for joint use, and commit itself not to duplicate.

Thus the more that Europe contributed to NATO's general purpose forces, the more the United States would contribute. In return Europe would agree:

- * To offset fully America's balance of payments deficit on military account.
- * To establish an institution within the North Atlantic Alliance (and we hope this would be the role of the European Program Group) which would permit Europe collectively to plan, finance and manage bilateral, non-duplicative, multi-annual, multi-project defense research, development, production and support programs with the United States and Canada.

Full offset would be delayed during a transition period since many of the foreign exchange costs now borne entirely by the United States would automatically become a shared NATO cost in a NATO Logistic System.

Then, taking a leaf from the statesmen who negotiated the Hyde Park Agreement, Europe and North America would agree to the following interim and long-range goals for each other:

Current Inventories and Days of Supply: A goal of \$2.0 billion per year, over and above current defense budgets to be spent each year for the next five years by Europe and by North America (a) to achieve optimum interoperability of current weapons, equipment and communications, and (b) to reach agreed uniform "days of supply" throughout the Alliance.

Equipment Standardization Agreements (STANAGs): Implementation each year of at least 20% of the 300 material STANAGs already agreed, and implementation within a year of all new material STANAGs.

Research: A three year goal for harmonizing all defense basic research, and establishing the widest possible NATO technology base.

Development: An initial three year goal of \$4.0 billion of complementary development projects underway on each side of the Atlantic.

Procurement: A three year goal of \$3.0 billion of defense procurement orders from one another.

Logistics: A four year goal for common logistic support of all common weapons and equipment now in Allied inventories.

North Atlantic Defense Market: By successive development, procurement and logistic support goals, Europe and North America would (by the twelfth year) achieve complete military-industrial interdependence within a fully-functioning North Atlantic Defense Market.

The short term goals will correct our most glaring conventional force deficiencies. They will also provide jobs to speed the transition from fourteen national defense markets to a North Atlantic Defense Market with a continental-scale producer and consumer base in Europe and in North America. The political cohesion, the public confidence and the real and measurable results obtained in the early years, will guarantee the political commitment to see the job through.

Mr. Chairman, these goals are demanding, but so is the response required by the Warsaw Pact challenge. The goals are attainable, unless we are prepared to concede that the free political institutions of the North Atlantic Alliance are not the equal of the authoritarian institutions of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. The goals must be met. Today, far more than fifteen years ago when President KENNEDY first made the point: we must be able to offer our people something more than a choice between surrender, or nuclear war.

But when Europe and North America, the two richest, most technologically advanced industrial economies in the world, are seen by the Soviet Union to have at last the political will to join their enormous resources for their common defense, the day may be near (and long before all goals are met) when we can begin to make detente a fearless reality.

THOMAS A. CALLAGHAN JR., Director
Allied Interdependence Project
Georgetown Center for Strategic and
International Studies

Supplement: Article entitled, "STANDARDIZATION: Le Defi American a l'Europe"
NATO Review, 11 October, 1976.

The Director

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

Executive Registry

77-5003/A

25 JUL 1977

Mr. Gerald Sullivan
Center for Strategic and
International Studies
Georgetown University
1800 K Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Gerry,

Thanks for keeping me informed of pertinent developments
in the Georgetown arena. In coping with the problem you mention,
I can use all the help and advice I can get. Your comments
are always welcome.

Sincerely,

STANSFIELD TURNER

A/DCI/PAO/HEH/kss/11 July

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Remarks:

*As per DCI acknowledgment
& brief comment.*

Executive Secretary


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The Oceanic Educational Foundation

Office of the President

July 23, 1977

Dear Stan,

It was good hearing from you and I very much appreciated your thoughtful note.

Despite your inordinately heavy load these days, which I must say you appear to be handling with marked wisdom, I felt the educational effort as projected by the attached would be something you would wish to encourage.

With warm regards.

Sincerely,

Gilven M. Slonim
President

Admiral Stansfield Turner U.S. Navy
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

GMS/fs

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The Oceanic Educational Foundation

Office of the President

A CARTER ADMINISTRATION OCEANIC EDUCATION PROGRAM

"EDUCATION FOR AN OCEANIC FUTURE"

Vice President Mondale announced to the NEA in Minneapolis, Minnesota in early July of this year that this Administration was willing to invest an additional billion and a half dollars in the education of American youth.

Where better to allocate these funds productively than in the emerging Oceanic Educational process aiming, as it does, to bring American education into balance, at all levels, between land and sea! As we have been told on numerous occasions, we know far more about the backside of the moon than we do about the drop of water upon which each of us, as all living organisms, depend for survival. Nowhere is the need for education more critical than in the spectrum of disciplines termed sea-study which advances our knowledge of "the human stake" in negotiating the World Ocean as man's Great Frontier of the Future.

Horace M. Kallen the venerable philosopher-educator accentuated this need, prior to his death, in a letter to the President of the University of Virginia, a fellow member of the Board of Directors of the newly formed Oceanic Educational Foundation:

"In principle, I had believed from the beginning that such an action would need to be planned as a nuclear part of the Foundation's purpose to educate the American people as citizens of a free society of free men with ineluctable global relations".

"In view of the little that had then been known of the role of the oceans in the formation, ongoing evolution and struggle for survival of human beings, I am convinced that a

reliable knowledge-in-depth of the oceans would have, at least an equal, and with considerable likelihood a higher, survival value for the future of mankind than man's knowledge of the land".

"In this climate of opinion, it is as a contribution to mankind's survival that Oceanic Education must be conceived and developed. This calls for the orchestration of culture and vocation in such wise that "vocation" is recognized as a cultural discipline and "culture", as the intellectual and esthetic insight into vocation. The curricular of Oceanic Education from kindergarten through professional and adult schools must consist of such orchestrations, and be accepted as the content of liberal education".

Nowhere does major investment whether in research or in education, promise to pay such profitable dividends as in this oceanic thrust. Unfortunately, people are hardly educated to their dependence upon the great ocean - - what the seas means in the provision of resources, increasingly in short supply on the land, to meet their mounting needs; what they mean in the development of dynamic leisure patterns of oceanic enjoyment; what they mean to an understanding of the Blue Planet upon which they live; what they mean to their very future quality of life. Homo sapiens, as Kallen suggests, simply are not educated, as yet, as to how the seas can reenforce human values, nor how the oceanic world can strengthen the entire fabric of modern society.

Most significant, by far, is the promise of the sea for youth, once fuller education relating to the oceanic domain is afforded. Unfolding professional opportunities for progressive young people, earnestly endeavoring to make their creative contribution to society, loom as nearly limitless. Already these young people, sensing the prospect of the oceanic world, are turning in ever increasing numbers to probe the professional potentials of the sea.

For the most part, they are stimulated by their enjoyment of water, their thrilling, yet exacting seacreational experiences. Challenged by the disciplines demanded by this tough task master, to enjoy - to survive - to develop a reassuring confidence in the water, they accept the demands for both training and education to learn how to water ski, how to scuba dive and to sail, to surf - - all of the fascinating leisure recreational outlets, which, already have lured most of the American population toward the seashore. They are vital. They are alive. Buoyant in their enjoyment of this tantalizing environment, through healthful action in the surf, sand and sun, they become sensitive to the issues of the sea, the promise of the ocean. They commence to realize what this vast oceanic expanse, some 328,000,000 cubic miles of water, can mean for people in the centuries which lie ahead, if we learn to protect, to preserve, indeed, to enhance this expansive environment. They recognize the mysteries, the majesty, the beauty of this vital body of water we term the World Ocean. Indeed, the "Humanities of the Sea" forge into the forefront through the dynamic involvement of people with the sea, as a master teacher of the more profound human values, the philosophic overtones of life. And, as people of all ages now commence to seek more knowledge of this fascinating dimension of our universe, unfortunately, they suddenly realize how shockingly limited our oceanic understanding remains.

But whether young people filled with hopes, ambitions, dreams of the future are uncertain as to what they want to do with their lives, or whether, once having sailed the seas, they have charted fairly well laid courses of

future endeavor, the World Ocean beckon their nimble minds as it plays upon their emotions, their feelings. For they are among the first to learn the place of the sea in their lives. In mounting numbers, the maritime magnet attracts American citizens to an unprecedented relationship with the world of water. Whether it is the curiosities aroused, the quest for self preservation or the 15% discount offered by marine insurance companies for those taking required boat handling courses, the interest curve in Oceanic Education spirals steeply upward. Just as small boats have become big business with a yearly expenditure by sportsmen of nearly five billions of dollars, colleges sensitive to this "Think Deep" educational trend show a peaking in student enrollments rather than the normal decline. The creativity stimulated by the surge in sea-study, which treats the World Ocean properly as a holistic entity of globe girding oceans, seas, lakes and rivers, shows the affirmative attitudinal values the seas infuse within human thought. It was this same sea thinking forged by uses of the sea, through century long demands before the mast, which according to Buckminster Fuller "has changed our world".

Whether these young people plan to be scientists, educators, statesmen, industrialists, architects, creative writers, doctors, nurses, artists, journalists, musicians, or composers, a myriad of unfolding fields of comparable contribution emerge through sea-study, at-sea experience, and new oceanic knowledge. Some can become seacrobe hunters in a new field of tremendous promise, medicines from the sea. A cancer cure looms as the most tantalizing challenge for their scientific sea search. Their aqua lungs for scuba diving can be turned to another new field, the aqua police who are needed to protect

the hordes of people now moving toward the sea frontiers to build their futures, or for mere enjoyment. In the realm of those seeking the seas for futuristic professional accomplishments, they will join with the designers of swifter ships driven by exotic new fuels, who wait in the wings of this symphony of the sea to capture, to capitalize upon the wonders of the modern oceanic world.

For those with a leaning toward the Bar, Law of the Sea frustrations, the decade long decisionless dialogues of the United Nations, emphasize the urgency of finding finely honed minds trained to deal with the oceans with a firm global grasp. The same sense of the sea Hugo Grotius revealed in his Mare Liberum doctrine of the 17th Century, beyond mere legalistic negotiating positions, is needed now in drafting a modern constitution of the sea. The new dimension of understanding infused through at-sea experience will lead to the balanced long, long view. As man, beset by the tensions and torments of his swiftly spinning modern world, grasps for restorative oceanic space, a new class of innovative youth trained to orchestrate the growing global oceanic struggles through generalists sea-study, will conceptualize policies toward tomorrow's futuristic world beyond even the 21st Century. While probing for solutions to perplexing problems of today, this expansive outreach toward oceanic potential promises an entirely new order of future living.

How often President Carter, the first oceanically educated President in American history, calls upon his background of seafaring to condition his conceptual policy thought. How easily he moves within the policy arena. In

enjoining his administration to the quest for enlightened policy, he called upon colleges and universities for creative thought, emphasizing with convincing clarity the criticality of education capable of undergirding the emerging Oceanic Policy process he encouraged. The insight seems strikingly significant. For had there been realization that the frustrations of failure ever since the post war period to deal adequately in National Oceanic Policy stemmed primarily from the landed thought, the landed education, the lack of actual seafaring experience of most American citizens, unquestionably, there would have been discernment of the necessity for expanding Oceanic Education. But, unfortunately, the Baconian dictum of knowledge being power, only now reaches the sea. The realization of the educational imperative to fire national policy - - to negotiate the New Oceanic Frontier is of recent discovery.

Just as the "Tall Ships" with the dramatic directness of Walter Cronkite's interpretation reminded citizens of the maritime heritage of these United States, a new but compelling certainty emerges in the wake of the Bicentennial celebration that America's future will be inextricably tied to the oceanic world. How well the Nation rises to this challenge of the sea will depend ultimately upon the enlightenment, the determination, the direction of its policy drive. This, perforce, is a function of how well its people understand the sea. Not merely in terms of the oceanographer's technological-scientific study of the tides, the currents, the solar fire power, the physical, the biological, the geologic attributes of the sea, but every single substantive aspect of the global sea's influence upon the human condition.

In advance of this progression, there is an evident need for oceanic knowledge; a comprehensive educative process; a resolute research requirement, spanning basic, as well as applied scientific investigation, reenforced by all human dimensions of scholarly disciplines through the integrative humanities of our world sea.

With the will of the people now being expressed oceanward, the demographic trend is toward the sea. The 1970 census already shows 83% of the American people residing in Coastal States. In pragmatic terms, this Nation's political axis once again reposes squarely, and undeniably within the Coastal-Oceanic Zone. With public education, the emergence of an oceanic constituency appears inevitable.

To serve the preponderant portion of the American people, to fire the American Oceanic Policy process, the President has expressed his commitment toward launching the first intellectual attack on the World Ocean. For America must invest its energies and ingenuity, as well as additional educative resources, in the multi-cultural, multi-disciplinary Oceanic Education to sharpen its citizen's understanding of the World Ocean. Once knowing their profound stake in the sea, their new knowledge will enrich their sense of the future destiny of this great nation which manifestly remains oceanic.

Vice President Mondale has moved in the wake of the Presidential mandate to enlighten our people as to their destiny through new investments in education. With acceptance for directing resources toward the intellectual no-man's water covered land, the maritime domain, new vistas of far reaching

goals will evolve which can bring our world within a global grasp. a heightened sense of purpose, as we move with the maturity of well seasoned seafarer's policy thinking buttressed by well structured sea-study toward new plateaus of innovative progress. Patently, with reenforced knowledge to negotiate the New Frontier of the Future, America's destiny, now etched with unmistakable certainty upon the distant horizon, serves to uplift the spirit with the fresh start, the inspiration one finds in pioneering toward a more fulfilling tomorrow.

Gilven M. Slonim
President

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

77-7234/A

28 April 1977

Dear Gil,

Your warm letter of 1 April 1977 was much appreciated. It is gratifying to have your expression of understanding and support. I will do my best to live up to your expectations.

I am glad to see you are still carrying on your own fine work as a lecturer on ocean subjects. The work of your foundation to foster education on ocean matters at the secondary school and junior college levels is important and I wish you well in your endeavors.

Thank you again for your thoughtful words.

Yours,



STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy

Mr. Gilven M. Slonim
President
The Oceanic Educational Foundation
3710 Whispering Lane
Falls Church, Virginia 22041

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Dear Gil:

Your warm letter of 1 April 1977 was much appreciated. This Administration does indeed face major problems in the world, those associated with the oceans not least among them. It is gratifying to have your expression of understanding and support.

I am aware, in this regard, of your own fine work as a lecturer on ocean subjects and of the work of your foundation to foster education on ocean matters at the secondary school and junior college level. I wish you well in these endeavors.


Thank you again for your thoughtful words.

Yours,

STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U. S. Navy

Mr. Gilven M. Slonim
President
The Oceanic Educational Foundation
3710 Whispering Lane
Falls Church, Virginia 22041

CONCUR:



Deputy Director for Intelligence

22 APR 1977
Date

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Recorder

Jack Blake did discuss this matter with the DCI, and the DCI asked that a meeting with Mr. Cline be arranged.

On 11 August, I called Mr. Cline's office to set up the meeting. He is out of the city until 1 September; meeting set up for 1615 on Tuesday, 6 September, at ~~EOB~~ (Cline works just a couple of blocks away).
changed to CIA HQS.

BLP
11 Aug 77

Date

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